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1 Introduction
Information can be de…ned very broadly as anything that can be digitized (i.e.,
encoded as a stream of bits), such as text, images, voice, data, audio and
video (see Varian, 1998). Information is exchanged under a wide range of for-
mats or packages (which are not necessarily digital). These formats are gener-
ically called information goods. Books, movies, music, magazines, databases,
telephone conversations, stock quotes, web pages, news, etc. all fall into this
category. Most information goods are expensive to produce but cheap to repro-
duce. This combination of high …xed costs and low (often negligible) marginal
costs implies that information goods are inherently nonrival. Moreover, be-
cause reproduction costs are also potentially very low for anybody other than
the creator of the good, information goods might be nonexcludable, in the sense
that one person cannot exclude another person from consuming the good in
question. The degree of excludability of an information good (and hence the
creator’s ability to appropriate the revenues from the production of the good)
can be enhanced by legal authority–typically by the adoption of laws protecting
intellectual property (IP)–or by technical means (e.g., cable broadcast are en-
crypted, new CDs are copy-protected). However, complete excludability seems
hard to achieve: simply specifying intellectual property laws does not ensure
that they will be enforced; similarly, technical protective measures are often
imperfect and can be “cracked”. As a result, illicit copying (or piracy) cannot
be completely avoided.
Over the last decade, the fast penetration of the Internet and the increased
digitization of information have turned piracy of information goods (in particu-
lar music, movies and software) into a topic of intense debate. Not surprisingly,
economists have recently shown a renewed interest in information goods piracy.
The recent contributions (see the critical review of Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003)
and the references therein) revive the literature on the economics of copying and
copyright, which was initiated some twenty years ago (with the notable excep-
tion of Plant (1934); for a recent survey (and extension) of the early literature,
see Watt, 2000). Generally, the literature on the economics of copying and
copyright abstracts away the strategic interaction among producers of informa-
tion goods. It is generally argued that the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation
between information goods (like CDs or books) is so large that one can assume
that the demand for any particular good is independent of the prices of other
goods. An exception is Johnson (1985): his ‘…xed cost model’ considers a copy-
ing technology that involves an investment in costly equipment. As the author
emphasizes, “[a]n interesting feature of this model is that the demand for any
particular work is a¤ected indirectly by the prices of other works since they
a¤ect a consumer’s decision to invest in the copying technology”. However,
because the focus is mainly on the welfare implications of copying, Johnson
(1985) does not fully explore the e¤ects of the strategic interaction induced by
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the …xed cost of copying.
The aim of the present paper is to address more systematically the strategic
interaction among producers of information goods, which is induced by the
existence of increasing returns to scale in the copying technology. Like a number
of recent papers, we use the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
for modelling vertical (quality) di¤erentiation: copies are seen as lower-quality
alternatives to originals (i.e., if copies and originals were priced the same, all
users would prefer originals). Information goods are assumed to be perfectly
horizontally di¤erentiated. This does not mean, however, that the demands for
di¤erent goods can be treated as independent: as in Johnson (1985), demands
are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns
to scale.
As a …rst step, we abstract away from strategic interaction and solve the case
of a cartel selling all information goods as a bundle. In this case, the model boils
down to the single-good problem analyzed in, e.g., Belle‡amme (2002), Yoon
(2002) or Bae and Choi (2003). The cartel faces two types of users with two
di¤erent behaviors and demand functions: “loyal users” prefer not to use any
good rather than copying them all; the opposite prevails for “copying users”.
Together, the two categories of users de…ne a kinked demand curve for the cartel.
Pro…t maximization over such demand yields three possible attitudes, which we
can describe by using Bain (1956)’s taxonomy of an incumbent’s behavior in
the face of an entry threat. The cartel is either able to ‘blockade’ piracy, or
the cartel must decide whether to ‘deter’ piracy (through limit-pricing) or to
‘accommodate’ it. We delineate regions of parameters where each of these
three attitudes is observed. Intuitively, the cartel chooses to blockade, deter
or accommodate piracy if the quality/price ratio of copies is, respectively, low,
intermediate or high.
We turn next to an oligopoly setting where each information good is con-
trolled by a single producer. Because of increasing returns to scale in copy-
ing, the demand for some original depends on the prices of all other originals.
To make the analysis of the pricing game tractable, we focus on symmetric
Bertrand-Nash equilibria (in pure strategies). Accordingly, we derive the de-
mand for the original supplied by an individual …rm under the assumption that
all other originals are priced the same. The main source of complexity comes
from the fact that, when we consider the demand for a single original (rather
than for a bundle containing all originals), a third category of users appears.
So-called “reversing users” change their attitude towards the other goods ac-
cording to the use they make of the good supplied by the individual …rm: if they
do not purchase that good, they prefer to copy it along with the other goods;
if they do purchase that good, they decide either to purchase the other goods
or not to use them. The presence of reversing users signi…cantly complicates
the analysis. Demand functions may include many regimes because each …rm
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can face three categories of users or some combination of these. Such demand
peculiarities yield best response function with upward and downward sloping
segments, upward and downward jumps.
Despite these complexities, we are able to present some general results about
symmetric equilibria in the pricing game. First, we establish that oligopolists
are able to blockade piracy over the same range of parameters as the cartel
(basically when the quality/price ratio of copies is very low). Second, we show
that deterrence of piracy cannot be a symmetric equilibrium when the quality of
copies is su¢ciently low (in the sense that users value n copies less than (n ¡ 1)
originals). To get some intuition about this result, note that in that case, high
valuation users are loyal users: the bad quality of copies refrain them to use the
copying technology. The consumer basis of an individual …rm consists thus of
two types of users: …rstly, loyal users who are willing to buy the original at any
price above some limit price and, secondly, reversing users who are willing to
change their decision to copy only if the individual …rm sets some prices below
the limit price. Therefore, to deter potential reversing users, each individual …rm
must set a price above the limit price. The candidate for a symmetric equilibrium
in such case would be a price larger than the unconstrained monopoly price on
loyal users. But then, each …rm would have an incentive to free-ride on the
other …rms’ deterrence e¤ort and set the monopoly price. A third general
result concerns accommodation of piracy. Intuitively, if all other …rms set a
high price and entice users to pirate, the best response for a single …rm is to
set a low price and accommodate piracy. It is therefore likely that …rms do not
set the same price, which means that accommodation of piracy cannot be a
symmetric equilibrium. This is certainly true when the price of other originals
is larger than some upward limit that we identify.
Although these results are important, they fall short of giving a full char-
acterization of symmetric equilibria in the pricing game. To reach a full char-
acterization, we examine two classes of examples where the number of kinks in
the demand function is usefully reduced. First, we focus on the case where the
number of varieties is su¢ciently large so that the average cost of copying the
last original is a constant. In that case, there exists no symmetric equilibrium
as soon as copies are attractive enough so that piracy cannot be blockaded.
The inexistence of symmetric equilibria stems from …rms’ free-riding behavior
with respect to the threat of piracy. If all …rms takes this threat seriously and
quote low prices to accommodate users, then they put a price too low and there
exists an opportunity for a single …rm to raise its price while keeping a su¢-
ciently large demand and making a larger pro…t. The latter result is driven by
the presence of a signi…cant number of users with very low value for originals
and copies. In the second class of examples, we focus instead on users with a
su¢ciently high valuation for originals and copies. Now, more equilibria may
exist. In particular, it is possible to …nd situations where the common price set
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by all …rms deters or accommodates piracy.
Finally, we draw some insights by comparing cartels and oligopolies. In
oligopolies, individual …rms are able to free ride on each other by extract-
ing some additional copiers’ or buyers’ surplus which cannot be appropriated
through the single price of the cartel. This leads to several implications. First,
in contrast to cartels, there often exists no equilibrium with a symmetric (sin-
gle) price in oligopolies. Second, symmetric prices in oligopolies (if they exist)
can exceed the cartels’ price. For instance, when users have high valuations for
originals and copies, the equilibrium price that accommodates piracy is larger
for oligopolies than for cartels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the
model. In Section 3, we analyse the case of a cartel selling the information
goods as a bundle. Next, we turn to the oligopoly case. First, we determine
the demand for a single original in Section 4. Second, we derive best responses
and general results about symmetric equilibria in Section 5. Third, to get
more speci…c results, we examine two particular cases in Section 6: we assume
either that there are many varieties or we focus on high valuation users; we also
provide some elements of comparison with the cartel case. Finally, we conclude
in Section 7.
2 Users
There is a continuum of potential users who can consume from a set N of
information goods (with jN j ´ n ¸ 2). These information goods are assumed
to be perfectly (horizontally) di¤erentiated and equally valued by the users. In
particular, users are characterized by their valuation, µ, for any information
good. We assume that µ is uniformly distributed on the interval [µ; µ].
Each information good i 2 N is imperfectly protected and thus “piratable”.
As a result, users can obtain each information good in two di¤erent ways: they
can either buy the legitimate product (an “original”) or acquire a copy of the
product. It is reasonable to assume that all users see the copy as a lower-
quality alternative to the original.1 Therefore, in the spirit of Mussa and Rosen
(1978), we posit some vertical (quality) di¤erentiation between the two variants
of any information good: letting so and sc denote, respectively, the quality of
an original and a copy, we assume that 0 < sc < so.2
As for the relative cost of originals and copies, we let pi denote the price of
1This assumption is common (see, e.g., Gayer and Shy, 2003) and may be justi…ed in several
ways. In the case of analog reproduction, copies represent poor substitutes to originals and are
rather costly to distribute. Although this is no longer true for digital reproduction, originals
might still provide users with a higher level of services, insofar as that they are bundled with
valuable complementary products which can hardly be obtained otherwise.
2Similar models are used by Koboldt (1995) to consider commercial copying and by Yoon
(2002) and Bae and Choi (2003) to analyze the market for a single information good.
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original i and we assume that users have access to a copying technology with
the following properties. Letting C(y) denote the total cost of y illicit copies
(and AC(y) = C(y)=y denote the average cost), we assume
Assumption 1 C(y) > C(y ¡ 1) and AC(y) · AC(y ¡ 1);
Assumption 2 AC(n) < µsc < AC(1):
According to Assumption 1, the copying cost function is increasing and
exhibits (weakly) increasing returns to scale in copying.3 The assumption for
continuous number of copies would be C 0(y) > 0 ¸ C 00(y). In the sequel we will
use the notation C0(y) to denote C(y)¡C(y¡1). Assumption 2 simply says that
no user will invest in the copying technology if it is to copy only one original
(µsc < C(1) 8µ), but that some users might invest if it is to copy all n originals
(9µ s.t. µnsc > C(n)). The combination of Assumptions 1 and 2 implies that
constant returns to scale may apply only for a limited range of copies: the
copying technology exhibits strict increasing returns to scale anywhere else.
Putting these elements together (and normalizing to zero the utility from
not consuming a particular information good), we can express the user’s utility
function. If a user indexed by µ purchases a subset X µ N (with 0 · jXj ´
x · n) of originals and acquires a number y of copies (with 0 · y · n¡x), her
net utility is given by
Uµ(x; y) = µ (xso + ysc) ¡
X
i2X
pi ¡ C(y): (1)
By the properties of C(y), the utility function is strictly convex in y. Moreover,
if a subset of the original goods are sold at the same price, the utility function
is also strictly convex in the number of goods purchased. In such a situation,
all goods in the subset are symmetric (same price, same quality of originals and
copies) and it follows that the most pro…table option for the users is always to
make the same use of all these goods. We demonstrate this result in the next
lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a subset S µ N (with 0 < jSj ´ s · n). Suppose pj = p
8j 2 S. Then any user maximizes her utility over the goods in S by either
purchasing, copying, or not using them all.
Proof. Let x (resp. y) denote the number of goods in subset S that user µ
chooses to purchase (resp. copy), with 0 · x+y · s. Let y0 denote the number
3The magnitude of these increasing returns to scale will depend on the precise nature of
copying: returns will be quite low if copies are acquired piecemeal on a parallel market from
some large-scale pirate; returns will be much larger if copies are directly produced by the
consumer himself (for instance, by burning CDs using a CD-RW drive).
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of goods in the complementary subset S0 = N n S that user µ chooses to copy.
The user’s utility on the goods in subset S can then be rewritten as
USµ (x; y) = x (µso ¡ p) + yµsc ¡ C(y + y0):
For any y0, this expression is convex in x and y. Hence, the maximum can only
be reached at corner solutions: x = y = 0, x = s, or y = s.
The previous result proves useful to derive the demand function for some
speci…c original i 2 N from expression (1). We consider two cases in turn.
First, as a benchmark, we suppose that the n producers of originals act as a
cartel and choose a unique price for all originals. Next, we turn to an oligopoly
setting and solve the pricing game for its symmetric equilibria.
3 Cartel
This section presents the benchmark case of a cartel setting a single price for all
supplied varieties. The cartel indeed o¤ers an interesting point of comparison
since, in this case, the model boils down to the single-good problem analyzed in,
e.g., Belle‡amme (2002), Yoon (2002) or Bae and Choi (2003). In addition, it
is realistic to assume that, in order to preserve the cartel’s stability, producers
restrain themselves to set the same price for all originals.4
Suppose that the n producers of originals form a cartel. The cartel’s ob-
jective is to maximize joint pro…ts by choosing the price p at which originals
are sold. From Lemma 1, we know that users will treat all goods alike and,
depending on p, will decide either to purchase all goods, or to copy them all,
or not to use any. Therefore, user µ will purchase all originals if and only if
Uµ(n; 0) ¸ maxfUµ(0; n); Uµ(0; 0)g; (2)
where Uµ(n; 0) = n (µso ¡ p), Uµ(0; n) = nµsc ¡ C(n), and Uµ(0; 0) = 0. Devel-
oping the latter condition, one observes that the cartel faces two types of users
with two di¤erent behaviors and demand functions.
“Loyal users”. Users for whom Uµ(0; 0) ¸ Uµ(0; n) () µ · AC (n) =sc
prefer not to use any good rather than copying them all. The cartel considers
thus these users as “loyal”, as it faces no threat of copying from them. Condition
(2) rewrites for loyal users as n (µso ¡ p) ¸ 0: The ‘marginal loyal user’, who is
identi…ed by µ`(p) = p=so, is indi¤erent between purchasing all originals and not
using any good. Inverting the previous relation, we de…ne the inverse demand
for loyal users as the following price function:
p`(µ) = µso:
4Note that the cartel di¤ers from the multiproduct monopolist in the sense that the cartel is
not allowed to use price discrimination. A complete analysis of the multiproduct monopolist’s
pro…t-maximizing price schedule is beyond the scope of this paper.
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“Copying users”. On the other hand, users for whom Uµ(0; n) ¸ Uµ(0; 0)
prefer to copy all goods rather than not using them. For these “copying” users,
condition (2) rewrites as n (µso ¡ p) ¸ nµsc ¡ C(n). The ‘marginal copying
user’, identi…ed by
µc (p) =
p ¡ AC(n)
so ¡ sc ;
is indi¤erent between purchasing and copying all goods. The corresponding
inverse demand is given by
pc(µ) = µ (so ¡ sc) + AC(n):
In sum, the price function facing the cartel can simply be written as
p (µ) = min
n
p` (µ) ; pc (µ)
o
=
(
p` (µ) if µ · AC (n) =sc;
pc (µ) otherwise.
This price function yields the type of the marginal buyer when he/she is a loyal
or a copying user. It is piece-wise linear and weakly concave in µ. The slope of
the linear pieces are such that (d=dµ)pc (µ) < (d=dµ)p` (µ).
Targeting loyal users or accommodating copying users? Let µ`c =
AC (n) =sc denote the user who separates loyal and copying users. We have
that p` (µ`c) = pc (µ`c) = (so=sc)AC (n) ´ ¹p. We call ¹p the copying deterrence
price: for p · ¹p, the cartel impedes copying users to copy and faces only loyal
users.5 We can thus write the embedded maximization problem the cartel must
solve in the following way:
max
¼
(
maxp ¼` (p) =
¡¹µ ¡ µ`(p)¢ p= ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ s.t. p · ¹p;
maxp ¼c (p) =
¡¹µ ¡ µc(p)¢ p= ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ s.t. p ¸ ¹p:
)
:
By analogy with Bain (1956)’s taxonomy of an incumbent’s behavior in the
face of an entry threat, we will say that the cartel is either able to ‘blockade’
copying, or that it must decide whether to ‘deter’ copying or ‘accommodate’
it. Let us now de…ne and compare these three options. Suppose …rst that the
cartel targets loyal users. The unconstrained pro…t-maximizing price and pro…t
per good are easily computed as
p`¤ = so
2
µ; ¼`¤ = so
4
¡¹µ ¡ µ¢µ2:
This solution meets the constraint if and only if p`¤ · ¹p () AC (n) ¸ (sc=2) µ.
In this case, we can say that copying is actually blockaded : the cartel safely sets
5This price corresponds to the usual limit price discussed in piracy models with a single
good (see, e.g., Bae and Choi, 2003).
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its price as if copying was not a threat. Otherwise, copying cannot be blockaded
but the cartel modi…es its behavior to successfully deter copying: it will choose
the highest price compatible with the constraints, i.e.,
pC = (so=sc)AC (n) ; which implies ¼C =
so
¡
µsc ¡ AC (n)¢AC (n)
s2c
¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ : :
The other option is to set a higher price and accommodate copying users.
Here, the unconstrained pro…t-maximizing price is equal to
pc¤ = 1
2
¡
(so ¡ sc) µ + AC (n)¢ ; which implies ¼c¤ = ¡(so ¡ sc) µ + AC (n)¢24 (so ¡ sc) ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ :
This solution satis…es the constraints if and only if
pc¤ ¸ ¹p () AC (n) · sc (so ¡ sc)
2so ¡ sc µ:
If the latter condition is not met, it is easily checked that the corner solution is
equivalent to copying deterrence.
Comparing the pro…t levels ¼`¤, ¼C , and ¼c¤, we conclude that the cartel’s
optimal strategy depends on the relative attractiveness of copies (i.e., for a given
value of so, on the values of AC (n) and sc), as summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The cartel’s pro…t-maximization price is
p¤ =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ p`¤ = so2 µ for sc2 µ · AC (n) · scµ (blockade),pC = AC(n)sosc for sc(so¡sc)2so¡sc µ · AC (n) · sc2 µ (deter),
pc¤ = (so¡sc)µ+AC(n)2 for 0 · AC (n) · sc(so¡sc)2so¡sc µ (accommodate).
We now turn to the oligopoly setting.
4 Demands for originals in oligopolies
We use expression (1) to derive the demand function for some speci…c original
i 2 N . As will soon become apparent, the demand for original i depends, in a
rather complicated way, on the relative quality of originals and copies (so and
sc), on the cost of copying, on the price of good i and, because of increasing
returns to scale in copying, on the prices of all other originals. To make the
analysis of the pricing game tractable, we focus on symmetric Bertrand-Nash
equilibria (in pure strategies). Accordingly, we derive the demand for original
i under the assumption that all other originals are priced the same: pj = p
8j 6= i.
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We …rst de…ne the condition under which a typical user µ is better o¤
purchasing good i (and choosing whichever use is the most pro…table for the
other goods) than copying or not using good i (and still choosing whichever
use is the most pro…table for the other goods). From Lemma 1, we know that
the most pro…table option is always to make the same use of all other goods.
Using this result, we can express the condition for user µ to buy an original of
information good i. To ease the exposition, we introduce the following notation.
Let
B¡iµ (p) ´ (n ¡ 1) (µso ¡ p) and Pµ(y) ´ y (µsc ¡ AC(y))
respectively be user µ’s utility from buying all goods but good i at price p and
user µ’s utility from “pirating” y goods. Then, we have the following result:
Lemma 2 Facing a price vector
³
pi; (pj = p)j 6=i
´
, a user of type µ purchases
original i if and only if
µso ¡ pi + maxfB¡iµ (p); 0; Pµ(n ¡ 1)g ¸ maxfB¡iµ (p); 0; Pµ(n)g: (3)
Proof. The left-hand side of the inequality follows directly from Lemma 1.
To derive the right-hand side, we express, in Table 1, the highest net utility user
µ can obtain from all n goods if she does not purchase good i. Assumption 2
(Pµ(1) < 0) rules out the top left and top right options as candidate maximum.
So does Assumption 1 for the bottom middle option. (For this option to be
maximum, we would need Pµ(n ¡ 1) > Pµ(n) () C(n) ¡ C(n ¡ 1) > µsc and
Pµ(n ¡ 1) > 0 () µsc > AC(n ¡ 1). But, as AC(n) < AC(n ¡ 1), the two
inequalities are clearly incompatible.) We are thus left with the three options
appearing in the right-hand side of inequality (3).
Other n ¡ 1 goods
Good i Purchased Copied Not used
Copied Pµ(1) + B¡iµ (p) Pµ(n) Pµ(1)
Not used B¡iµ (p) Pµ(n ¡ 1) 0
Table 1: Net utility when good i is not purchased
To derive the demand schedule for some original i, we need to express the
exact form of the purchasing decision (3) according to how the price of the other
originals compares with the value of the parameters. To clarify the exposition,
we analyze the case where Pµ(n) ¸ Pµ(n ¡ 1) () µ ¸ C 0 (n) =sc (we show in
a footnote that the other case is very simple). Developing expression (3), one
observes that …rm i potentially faces users with three di¤erent behaviors and
demand functions: on top of the loyal and copying users identi…ed in the cartel
case, there is a new category of so-called “reversing” users. Let us identify these
three categories.
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“Loyal users”. Users for whom maxfB¡iµ (p); 0g ¸ Pµ(n) are such that, what-
ever use they make of good i, they always prefer to purchase the (n ¡ 1) other
goods and never …nd it pro…table to invest in the copying technology. Therefore,
…rm i considers these users as loyal, as it faces no threat of copying from them.
Condition (3) rewrites for loyal users as µso¡pi ¸ 0: The ‘marginal loyal user’,
who is identi…ed by µ`(pi) = pi=so, is indi¤erent between purchasing original i
and not using good i; in any case, he/she purchases the n ¡ 1 other originals.6
Inverting the previous relation, we de…ne the inverse demand for loyal users as
the following price function:
p`i(µ) = µso:
“Copying users”. At the other extreme, users for whom maxfB¡iµ (p); 0g ·
Pµ(n ¡ 1) prefer to copy the (n ¡ 1) other goods whatever their decision about
good i. This is so because the price p of the other originals is su¢ciently high
for them. For these users, Condition (3) rewrites as µso¡pi+Pµ(n¡1) ¸ Pµ(n);
…rm i’s price is not going to change the users’ decision of investing in the copying
technology. The ‘marginal copying user’, identi…ed by
µc (pi) =
pi ¡ C0(n)
so ¡ sc ;
is indi¤erent between purchasing original i (and copying all other goods) and
copying all n goods. The corresponding inverse demand is given by
pci (µ) = µso ¡ (Pµ(n) ¡ Pµ(n ¡ 1)) = C0(n) + µ (so ¡ sc) :
Note that, as C 0(n) · AC(n), the inverse demand of copying users is lower in the
oligopoly case than in the cartel case. In the present case, users consider only
original i, whereas in the cartel case, they consider the bundle of all originals.
“Reversing users”. In contrast with the two previous groups, users for
whom Pµ(n) ¸ maxfB¡iµ (p); 0g ¸ Pµ(n ¡ 1) change their attitude towards
the (n ¡ 1) other goods according to the use they make of good i. If they do
not purchase good i, they prefer to copy it along with the other goods. If they
do purchase good i, they decide either to purchase the other goods or not to use
them, according to whether B¡iµ (p) is larger or lower than zero. More precisely,
we distinguish between two groups of “reversing users”.
6 If µ < C0 (n) =sc, we have users for whom Pµ(n¡1) > Pµ(n). It is straightforward to show
that these users are loyal. We can indeed check that maxfB¡iµ (p); 0g ¸ Pµ(n¡1). Suppose …rst
that p=so · µ · C0 (n) =sc. Then B¡iµ (p) ¸ Pµ(n ¡ 1) () µ ¸ [p¡AC (n¡ 1)] = (so ¡ sc).
But p=so ¸ [p¡AC (n¡ 1)] = (so ¡ sc) () p=so · AC (n¡ 1) =sc, which is the case as
C0 (n) < AC (n¡ 1). Suppose next that µ < p=so · C0 (n) =sc. Then 0 ¸ Pµ(n¡1) () µ ·
AC (n¡ 1) =sc, which is again the case as C 0 (n) < AC (n¡ 1).
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² We call “®-reversing users” those users for whom B¡iµ (p) ¸ 0 (i.e., if
µ ¸ p=so). Condition (3) rewrites for these users as µso ¡ pi + B¡iµ (p) ¸
Pµ(n). By setting too high a price, …rm i may trigger users to reverse their
decision of purchasing n¡1 items to copying all items. The marginal user
is identi…ed by
µ® (pi; p) =
pi + (n ¡ 1) p ¡ C(n)
n (so ¡ sc) ;
this user is indi¤erent between purchasing and copying all n originals.
The corresponding inverse demand is given by
p®i (p; µ) = µso ¡
¡
Pµ(n) ¡ B¡iµ (p)
¢
= C (n) ¡ (n ¡ 1) p + µn (so ¡ sc) :
² The “¯-reversing users” are such that B¡iµ (p) · 0 (i.e., if µ · p=so). The
di¤erence is that if these users purchase original i, they do not consume
the n ¡ 1 other goods. Here, condition (3) rewrites as µso ¡ pi ¸ Pµ(n).
The marginal user is identi…ed by
µ¯ (pi; p) =
C(n) ¡ pi
nsc ¡ so :
The corresponding inverse demand is given by
p¯i (µ) = µso ¡ Pµ(n) = C (n) ¡ µ (nsc ¡ so) :
In summary, the inverse demand for reversing users is given by pri (p; µ) =
max
n
p®i (µ; p); p
¯
i (µ)
o
.
Synthesis. The above analysis shows that users choose between loyal con-
sumption and three strategies of piracy: copy all, reverse to copying from buy-
ing (n ¡ 1) originals or from buying no original. The maximum price that each
user with type µ is willing to pay for original i is obviously the minimum of the
value of an original and the value of the best piracy strategy. That is,
pi(µ) = min
n
p`i(µ);max
h
pci (µ); p
®
i (µ; p); p
¯
i (µ)
io
: (4)
This ‘price function’ maps the user’s type µ with his largest willingness to pay
for the original i given the piracy alternatives. Function (4) is far from trivial for
three reasons: …rst, two cases have to be distinguished according to the relative
quality of copies, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2; second, the price function
can include kinks that depend on the price of the other goods; third, more than
one type of users may purchase the original at some ranges of prices pi. The
demand function for good i is obtained from this price function by aggregating
all types of purchasing users at each price pi. Naturally, the demand function
su¤ers from the same complexities as the price function. In particular, we show
below that it includes concave and convex kinks.
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Figure 1: Price function for good copies
As the properties of the price function and its kinks are at the core of
the oligopoly analysis, we now pay closer attention to the three sources of
complexity. Let us …rst compare the four functions composing pi(µ). We observe
the following: (i) p`i(µ), p
c
i(µ), p
®
i (p; µ) are increasing functions of µ, while p
¯
i (µ)
is a decreasing function of µ (assuming that n copies provide users with a larger
gross utility than a single original: nsc > so); (ii) p®i (p; µ) shifts downward as p
increases, while the other functions are independent of p.
Let us now examine where these functions intersect. We de…ne the cut-
o¤ type µkm as the user type for whom the schedule pki (µ; p) intersects with
pmi (µ; p), with k; m 2 f`; c; ®; ¯g. From Figures 1 and 2, it can be seen that the
price function pi(µ) corresponds to the inverse demand function of loyal users
with a ‘slice cut’, which might appear for types above µ¯` ´ AC(n)=sc; and
which spreads to the right as p increases (larger prices of the other goods make
the copying technology more attractive and thereby, constrain further …rm i’s
pricing possibilities). There can exist up to four kinks in the price function
pi(µ): on the one hand, the schedule max
n
pci ; p
®
i ; p
¯
i
o
generates at most two
kinks at some combinations of types µ®c, µc¯ or µ®¯; on the other hand, the
intersection of the latter schedule with the schedule p`i can also generate two
kinks at types µ¯` and µ®`.
As we are ultimately interested in …rm i’s reaction to the price of the other
goods, we need to understand the impact of p on the price function. First, it
is easily shown that no more than two kinks will vary with the price of other
goods p: these kinks are located at types µ®` and either µ®c or µ®¯. Second,
one readily checks that p®i (p; µ) increases in µ more steeply than p
`
i(µ) if and
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Figure 2: Price function for bad copies
only if (n ¡ 1) so > nsc. Thus, …rm i’s behavior is likely to di¤er according to
the state of the condition (n ¡ 1) so > nsc. We make the following de…nition.
De…nition 4.1 The copy technology delivers ‘good’ copies if nsc > (n ¡ 1) so
and ‘bad’ copies if nsc · (n ¡ 1) so.
We talk of ‘good copies’ when n copies provide users with more gross utility
than n ¡ 1 originals. Another way to put it is to say that all users loose less,
in terms of gross utility, when they consume copies instead of originals for all
goods (n (so ¡ sc)) than when they refrain from consuming a single original
(so). The distinction between good and bad copies is crucial when it comes to
separate loyal and ®-reversing users. In the case of good copies, high valuation
users (with µ > µ®` (p)) are ®-reversing users: as n copies provide all users with
more utility than (n ¡ 1) originals, users with higher valuations are more likely
to reverse to copying all items. One also observes that µ®` (p) is a decreasing
function of p. In the case of bad copies, we have the opposite situation: high
valuation users are loyal users. The bad quality of copies refrain the latter to
use the copying technology. Obviously, µ®` (p) is an increasing function of p.
Finally, we observe that more than one type of users may purchase the
original at some ranges of prices pi. For instance, when the price is equal to
p0i 2 (p¯i (µ¯`) ; p¯i (µc¯)) = (p¯i (AC(n ¡ 1)=sc) ; p¯i (AC(n)=sc)), the users who
are willing to purchase original i can be either loyal users (e.g. at p`i = p
0
i),
®-reversing users (e.g. at p®i = p
0
i) and ¯-reversing users (e.g. at p
¯
i = p
0
i). The
analysis of this particular section of the demand function is rather complicated
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and of limited interest in terms of economic insight. In the sequel, we shall
impose some assumptions to rule out the existence of more than one type of
users in the demand function.
Collecting the previous results, we can provide information about the nature
of some kinks in the price function pi, more precisely about the local convexity
of the kinks.
Lemma 3 Whether copies are good or bad, the price function is (increasing
and) concave in µ in the neighborhood of µ®`(p) and, (increasing and) convex
in the neighborhood of µ®c(p).
These properties can readily be checked in Figures 1 and 2 when the price of
the other goods is equal to p0 or p00. As a consequence, we anticipate that best
response functions will be continuous when shifting from regime (`) to (®); but
discontinuous when shifting from regime (®) to (c). The next section examines
this issue in detail.
5 Best responses and symmetric equilibria
In this section we determine …rm i’s best-response function when all other
originals are sold at the same price. Then, we characterize the symmetric
Bertrand-Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) by looking for the …xed points of
the best-response function. As we have just shown, demand functions include
many regimes because each …rm can face loyal users, full copying users, revers-
ing users or some combination of these. Such demand peculiarities may yield
best response function with upward and downward sloping segments, upward
and downward jumps. Before proposing several assumptions to alleviate the
complexity, we present some general results.
5.1 Attitude towards ®-reversing users
First, when other originals are su¢ciently cheap, piracy of good i can naturally
be blockaded. For bad copies, when the price of the other goods p is below
p`i (µ¯`) = AC(n)so=sc, copying attracts no user: all users are loyal. In other
words, there is no ‘slice cut’ in the price function displayed in Figure 2. Firm
i’s best response is the monopoly price on the demand of loyal users:
R¤i (p) = p`¤i ´ soµ=2
and the marginal buyer is equal to µ¤` = µ=2: For a price of the other originals
larger than or equal to AC (n) so=sc, an increase in the price of good i may entice
some users to reverse from buying the (n ¡ 1) other goods to copy all goods.
That is, the …rm may face ®-reversing users. In particular, when the price
p of other originals is su¢ciently large, the marginal loyal buyer (µ`¤i ´ µ=2)
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also becomes an ®-reversing user and …rm i can no longer apply the price
p`¤i . It is forced to revise its pricing decision along the price function pi (µ) =
min
©
p`i (µ) ; p
®
i (p; µ)
ª
.
In this context, the user with type µ®` (p) is a pivotal user. The maximal
price …rm i can charge to this user is equal to pDi (p) = p
`
i(µ®` (p)), i.e.,
pDi (p) =
(n ¡ 1) p ¡ C (n)
(n ¡ 1) so ¡ nsc so:
The function pDi (p) gives, for a given price p of the other originals, the price
of original i that deters loyal users from becoming ®-reversing users. The in-
terpretation of this so-called ‘®-reversing user deterrence price’ changes as we
consider good or bad copies.
² In the case of good copies (nsc > (n ¡ 1) so), …rm i’s consumer basis
consists of reversing users at any price pi ¸ pDi (p) and of loyal users at
smaller prices. Moreover, the limit-price pDi (p) decreases with p: as the
other originals become more expensive, reversing becomes more interest-
ing and users with the low valuations are enticed to reverse to copying.
To keep these users, …rm i decreases its price.
² Conversely, with bad copies (nsc < (n ¡ 1) so), …rm i’s consumer basis
consists of loyal users at any price pi ¸ pDi (p) and of reversing users at
smaller prices. To deter potential reversing users, …rm i must now set a
high enough price, pi ¸ pDi (p) : Here, the limit-price increases with p.
As the other originals become more expensive, the loyal users with the
lowest valuations becomes reversing users; because the demand of these
reversing users is rather inelastic, …rm i is willing to apply a higher price.
Given that demand functions are concave in µ around µ®` (see Lemma 3),
…rm i continuously moves, according to the value of p, between the three fol-
lowing situations. First, if the the price p of the other goods is large enough,
users never use the copying technology and …rm i’s price and marginal user are
given by p`¤i ´
¡
µ=2
¢
so and µ¤` ´ µ=2: Whether copies are good or bad, it turns
out that this solution is feasible as long as
p · pf ´ C (n)
n ¡ 1 +
(n ¡ 1) so ¡ nsc
2 (n ¡ 1) µ;
where pf is the price of competitors for which the ®-reversing user deterrence
price is equal to the optimal price charged to loyal users; that is pDi
¡
pf
¢
= p`¤i .
Note that when AC (n) =sc < µ=2, pf ¸ AC(n)so=sc if copies are bad and
pf < AC(n)so=sc if they are good. Thus, blockading stops to be a best response
at higher prices p of other originals under bad copying technologies than under
good copying ones. By analogy with Bain’s taxonomy, market conditions are
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such that potential entry (i.e., piracy) exerts no threat, so that incumbents (i.e.,
producers of originals) do not need to modify their behavior and continue to
act as (local) monopolists.
Second, when the price p of other goods is su¢ciently low, …rm i faces only
reversing users. Its optimal price and marginal user are now equal to
p®¤i (p) =
1
2
¡
µn (so ¡ sc) + C (n) ¡ (n ¡ 1) p¢ ;
µ¤® (p) =
µ
2
¡ C(n) ¡ (n ¡ 1) p
2n (so ¡ sc) :
This solution is feasible provided that (whether copies are good or bad)
p ¸ pd ´ C (n)
n ¡ 1 +
n (so ¡ sc) ((n ¡ 1) so ¡ nsc)
(n ¡ 1) ((n + 1) so ¡ nsc) µ;
where pd is the price of competitors for which the reversing user deterrence
price is equal to the optimal price charged to reversing users; that is, pDi
¡
pd
¢
=
p®¤i
¡
pd
¢
. It is readily checked that pd > pf :
Finally, when p takes intermediate values (i.e., between pf and pd), marginal
revenues are positive for any price above pDi (p) and negative below. Hence, …rm
i quotes the price pDi (p). This argument yields the following candidate for …rm
i’s best response function:
R(p) =
8><>:
p`¤i if 0 · p < pf ; (Blockading piracy)
pDi (p) if p
f < p · pd; (Deterring ®-reversing users)
p®¤i (p) if pd < p: (Accommodating ®-reversing users)
This function applies provided that users consist only of loyal and ®-reversing
users and that no other regime is more pro…table. The following lemma is now
trivial.
Lemma 4 There exists a price of the other goods bp1 > pf such that each …rm’s
best response is R¤i (p) = R(p) for p 2 [0; bp1].
This lemma establishes the following points. First, blockading is a sym-
metric equilibrium if p`¤i · pf . Using the above values, we get the condition
AC (n) =sc ¸ µ=2. Second, there always exists a range of price p such that
…rm i’s best response is to quote an ®-reversing user deterrence price. This
last point does not mean, nevertheless, that an equilibrium exists for which
all …rms quote the same ®-reversing user deterrence price. In other words, an
equilibrium involving deterrence of ®-reversing users may fail to exist. The
candidate symmetric equilibrium is given by the …xed point of pDi (p) = p. Sim-
ple computations show that this price is equal to pi = p = AC (n) so=sc. In
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the case of bad copies, we have argued above that for p = AC (n) so=sc, …rm
i’s price function coincides with the inverse demand function of loyal users.
Therefore, …rm i’s optimum is to set p`¤i and we do not have an equilibrium
with deterrence of ®-reversing users. In the case of good copies, on the other
hand, p®i (µ; p) may intersect with p
`
i(µ), which implies that it is possible to
have an equilibrium involving deterrence of ®-reversing users. One condition is
that pf < AC (n) so=sc, which is equivalent to AC(n)=sc < µ=2 (i.e., blockad-
ing is not a symmetric equilibrium). We summarize our results in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 Blockading piracy is a symmetric equilibrium for good and bad
copies if and only if AC (n) =sc ¸ µ=2. Deterrence of ®-reversing users is never
a symmetric equilibrium if copies are bad.
As it will be shown in the following sections, best response functions can
take di¤erent shapes for values of p above bp1. However, when the price p of
other originals is su¢ciently large, the …rm’s behavior is readily determined.
5.2 Attitude towards general piracy
When the price p of other originals is su¢ciently large, users are de…nitively
not attracted by originals and they engage in piracy. In this case, …rm i does
not …nd it pro…table to set a high price: it prefers to quote a lower price
and to accommodate piracy of its own original. This regime embeds several
complications because the …rm may face multiple types of pirates: copying
users, as well as ®- or ¯-reversing users. However, a relatively clearer picture
appears when the price p of other originals passes some threshold, so that the ®-
reversing behavior becomes dominated by ¯-reversing or copying. We identify
this threshold as pg such that p®i
¡
pg; µ
¢
= max
n
pci
¡
µ
¢
; p¯i
¡
µ
¢o
. In Figures 1
and 2, we have represented the case where pci
¡
µ
¢
> p¯i
¡
µ
¢
and p®i (p
g; µ) is the
price function that intersects schedule pci at µ = µ. Therefore, for p ¸ pg, there
exists no pi that can make ®-reversing users purchase original i. Firm i faces
the ‘lowest envelop of the price function’, which is depicted by the grey bold
line in Figures 1 and 2 and which can be written as:
pEi (µ) ´ min
n
p`i (µ) ;max
h
pci (µ) ; p
¯
i (µ)
io
: (5)
Maximization of pro…t over pEi (µ) yields the optimum price and pro…t, p
E¤
i and
¼E¤i . It follows that when the other originals are more expensive than pg, …rm
i’s best response is to set pE¤1 . At this stage, we take pE¤i and ¼E¤i as implicitly
determined and we can state the following proposition.7
7The exact characterization of pE¤i and ¼E¤i is cumbersome as the demand function can
combine di¤erent types of consumers. Explicit computations are provided in the Section 6
under some simplifying assumptions.
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Proposition 3 There exists a price of the other goods, bp2, such that each
…rm’s best response is R¤i (p) = pE¤i for p 2 [bp2;1). Furthermore, bp2 · pg ´
min
©
AC(n ¡ 1) + (so ¡ sc) µ; soµª.
Proof. The fact that R¤i (p) = pE¤i when p ¸ pg has been exposed above.
By continuity, any p smaller than pg also yields R¤i (p) = pE¤i except in the
particular case where pE¤i = pg which implies that bp2 = pg. Finally, the value
of pg is determined by solving p®i
¡
pg; µ
¢
= pci
¡
µ
¢
and p®i
¡
pg; µ
¢
= p¯i
¡
µ
¢
.
Can this regime can be associated with a symmetric equilibrium? Intu-
itively, if all other …rms set a high price and entice users to pirate, the best
response for a single …rm is to set a low price and accommodate piracy. It is
therefore likely that …rms do not set the same price. This is certainly true when
the price of other originals is larger than any feasible price for …rm i: that is,
when p > maxµ pEi (µ) : The following proposition indicates an upward limit on
the equilibrium price sustaining the current regime.
Proposition 4 If the price of the other originals is larger than pg, then there
are no ®-reversing users and accommodation of piracy is never a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
5.3 Jumps in the best response function
Kinks in the demand function have been identi…ed above. The possibility of
convex kinks implies downward jumps in the best response functions for prices
p of other originals in the interval [bp1; bp2]. Downward jumps can lead to the
absence of equilibria for some con…gurations of economic parameters. Because
more than one convex kinks may appear for prices p 2 [bp1; bp2]; the analysis of
the best response function in this interval is complex.
The analysis is simpli…ed when the ‘lowest envelop of the price function’
pEi (µ) does not include ¯-reversing users, meaning that expression (5) boils
down to
pEi (µ) ´ min
n
p`i (µ) ; p
c
i (µ)
o
:
In the sequel, we examine two classes of examples satisfying this require-
ment. First, we focus on the case where the number of varieties is su¢-
ciently large so that the average cost of copying the last original is a constant:
AC(n) = AC(n ¡ 1) = C0(n). Second, we focus on users with a su¢ciently
high valuation for originals and copies (i.e., we assume that µ ¸ AC(n¡1)=sc).
These examples are shown in the two panels of Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Price function for many goods and for users with high valuation
In this simpler case, optimal price and pro…t under pEi (µ) are equal to the
cartel price and pro…t as determined in Proposition 1. In addition, a unique
convex kink appears at the ‘copying/®-reversing’ user, µ®c(p), which increases
in p. As the price of other originals rises, the pro…t under deterrence or accom-
modation of ®-reversing users decreases and reaches the level of pro…t obtained
under accommodation of copying users. The price instantaneously jumps from
the high or intermediate price down to a lower price. We derive the following
property.
Lemma 5 Suppose that the lowest envelop of the price function is equal to
pEi (µ) ´ min
©
p`i (µ) ; p
c
i (µ)
ª
. Then, the interval [bp1; bp2] collapses to a single
point, bp. The best response function has no jump at bp if copies are good and ifbp 2 [pf ; pd]. Otherwise, the best response function has a downward jump at bp.
Proof. See the appendix.
The lemma reveals that in the case of good copies and bp 2 [pf ; pd], the
graph of the best response function is continuous and a symmetric equilibrium
exists. Still, although the lemma provides a rather complete description of best
response functions, it remains to determine the value of bp.
6 Symmetric equilibria in speci…c settings
We now turn to the two classes of examples we mentioned above. They allow
us to proceed further in the study of symmetric equilibria.
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6.1 Many varieties
In this section, we focus on the case where the number of varieties is large. It
is therefore natural to assume that the average cost of copying the last original
is a constant, and to restrict the attention to bad copies.
Assumption 3 AC(n) = AC(n ¡ 1) = C 0(n) and nsc < (n ¡ 1) so:
This simpli…cation allows us to consider a wide range of user valuations. In
particular, we do not want to exclude low valuation users (i.e., users who are
not willing to purchase or copy any good) and we impose:
Assumption 4 µ = 0:
Under assumption 3, users can never be ‘¯-reversing users’: they are either
loyal, ®-reversing or copying users. Accommodation of copying users can yield
the three prices pE¤i 2 fp`¤i ; pc¤i ; pCi g, which are the prices fp`¤; pc¤; pCg set by
the cartel because C0 (n) = AC (n) under Assumption 3. Lemma 5 can then
be applied. Each …rm chooses amongst four strategies: blockading, deterrence
of ®-reversing users, accommodation of ®-reversing users or of copying users.
From Proposition 2, we already know that blockading is the unique symmetric
equilibrium when µ=2 · AC (n) =sc, and that deterrence is never a symmetric
equilibrium when copies are bad. We thus only need to check whether there exist
equilibria with accommodation of ®-reversing users or of copying users. Yet,
it turns out that these regimes never yield symmetric equilibria. In particular,
when the other …rms choose to accommodate ®-reversing users, it is optimal
for …rm i to accommodate copying users. Conversely, when the other …rms
choose to accommodate copying users, it is optimal for …rm i to accommodate
®-reversing users. As a result, there exists no symmetric equilibrium when
µ=2 > AC (n) =sc.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, blockading piracy is the unique
symmetric equilibrium if AC (n) =sc ¸ µ=2. Otherwise there exists no symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
The inexistence of symmetric equilibria stems from …rms’ free-riding behav-
ior with respect to the threat of piracy. If all …rms takes this threat seriously
and quote low prices to accommodate users, then they put a price too low and
there exists an opportunity for a single …rm to raise its price while keeping
a su¢ciently large demand and making a larger pro…t. Our assumption of a
signi…cant number of users with very low value for originals and copies drives
the above result of absence of equilibria. As the next example shows, more
equilibria may exist when users highly value originals and copies.
21
6.2 High valuation users
In this section, we assume that users have a high valuation for originals and
copies. More speci…cally, we assume that no user ever …nds it optimal to refrain
from using any information good:
Assumption 5 µsc ¸ AC(n ¡ 1):
Under this assumption, the ‘lowest envelop of the price function’ pEi (µ) is
equal to pci (µ). The optimal price is equal to p
E¤
i = max fpc¤i ; pci (µ)g. For
simplicity, we assume interior solution (pE¤i = pc¤i ) which is guaranteed by the
following assumption:
Assumption 6 µ > 2µ + C 0(n)=(so ¡ sc).
Lemma 5 can be now applied. The price bp is found by comparing pro…t levels
under ®-reversing user deterrence and accommodation regimes with those under
the accommodation of copying users.
Let us characterize the best response function. There are two possible cases
according to whether bp is below or above pd. As shown in the appendix, the
price bp ´ bp0 is above pd if
C0(n) < C00 ´ (nsc ¡ (n + 1 ¡ 2
p
n) so) (so ¡ sc)
(n + 1) so ¡ nsc µ: (6)
In this case, the best response function is equal to
R¤i (p) =
8>><>>:
p`¤i if 0 · p < pf (piracy is blockaded),
pDi (p) if p
f < p · pd (®-reversing users are deterred),
p®¤i (p) if pd < p · bp0 (®-reversing users are accommodated).
pc¤i if p ¸ bp0 (copying users are accommodated).
where bp0 ´ pd + pnn¡1 [C00 ¡ C0 (n)] : Otherwise, the price bp ´ bp00 is below pd and
the best response function writes as
R¤i (p) =
8><>:
p`¤i if 0 · p < pf (piracy is blockaded),
pDi (p) if p
f < p · bp00 (®-reversing users are deterred),
pc¤i if p ¸ bp00 (copying users are accommodated).
where bp00 ´ pd ¡ 12(n¡1) [F (C0 (n)) ¡ F (C00)] and
F
¡
C 0 (n)
¢ ´ r³sc(so¡sc)¹µ2¡2C0(n)(so¡sc)¹µ¡C0(n)2´((n¡1)so¡nsc)2so(so¡sc) :
We now turn to the characterization of symmetric equilibria and examine
the four possible regimes.
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Blockading piracy. Combining Proposition 2 and Assumption 5 and 6, we
readily infer that blockading piracy cannot be a symmetric equilibrium. Because
not only high but also low valuation users get a large utility from copies, piracy
exerts such a threat that blockading is not feasible.
Deterrence of ®-reversing users. We know from Proposition 2 that deter-
rence of ®-reversing users is not an equilibrium under bad copies. In contrast,
under good copies, there exist parameter con…gurations supporting symmetric
equilibria with deterrence. We show in the appendix that under good copies,
Assumption 6 implies that C0(n) < C00, so that bp > pd. The conditions for a
symmetric equilibrium are: pDi
¡
pf
¢ · pf and pDi ¡pd¢ · pd, which write as
1
2
¹µ
µ
1 ¡ nsc ¡ (n ¡ 1) so
(n + 1) so ¡ nsc
¶
· AC (n) =sc < 12¹µ:
It is easily checked that the interval is open.
Accommodation of ®-reversing users. This strategy is feasible if and only
if C0(n) < C 00, , under which bp = bp0 < pd. In this case, there are two conditions
for a symmetric equilibrium:(
pd · pDi
¡
pd
¢ () AC (n) · 12¹µsc ³1 ¡ nsc¡(n¡1)so(n+1)so¡nsc´ ;bp0 ¸ p®¤i (bp0) () AC (n) ¸ (n+1)pn¡2n2n ¹µ (so ¡ sc) + (n+1)pn2n C0 (n) :
We show in the appendix that C0(n) < C 00 makes sure that the latter two
inequalities are compatible.
Accommodation of copying users. Copying users are accommodated when
…rms set the price pc¤i . We know that accommodation of copying users is never
a symmetric equilibrium if the price of the other originals is above pg. Under
the particular assumptions of this section, we can get a necessary and su¢cient
condition. Accommodation of copying users occurs if and only if pc¤i is larger
than bp0 or bp00. When C 0(n) < C00, optimal pro…t and price under accommoda-
tion are low. Given the low price of competitors, each individual …rm has an
incentive to deviate (by setting a higher price). Indeed, it can be shown ana-
lytically that pc¤i < bp0 for all admissible con…gurations of parameters, meaning
that accommodation of copying users cannot be a symmetric equilibrium when
C0(n) < C 00. Otherwise, accommodation of copying users can be a symmetric
equilibrium. It is so if and only if pc¤i ¸ bp00, which is equivalent to
AC (n) · 1
2n
¹µsc +
n ¡ 1
2n
C 0 (n) ¡ F (C
0 (n))
2n
: (7)
We cannot guarantee that the latter inequality is satis…ed under the assump-
tions of this section.
23
 
AC(n) 
C'(n) C0' 
45° 
Deterrence of a-reversing users 
Accommodation 
of a-reversing users 
No
symmetric
equilibrium
Ass. 5 
Ass. 6 
AC(n) 
C'(n) C0' 
45° 
Accomm. of 
a-reversing 
users 
No 
symmetric 
equilibrium 
Ass. 5 
Ass. 6 
Accommo- 
dation 
of copying 
users 
Good copies Bad copies 
Figure 4: Characterization of symmetric equilibria for good and bad copies
The previous results are illustrated in Figure 4 for selected values of the
parameters.
Discussion. Our initial restrictions on the economic parameters make sure
that, at the symmetric equilibrium of the game, the producers of information
goods are a¤ected by the users’ ability to make copies; indeed, there cannot be
an equilibrium where all producers behave as unconstrained local monopolists.
The question is then how producers modify their pricing behavior in the face of
copying. As depicted in Figure 4, the answer crucially depends on the properties
of the copying technology: that is, on the relative importance of the average
and marginal costs of copying (AC(n) vs. C 0 (n)), and on the relative quality
of copies (sc vs. so).
Consider …rst good copies. In this case, two di¤erent attitudes can emerge
at the symmetric equilibrium. If the copying technology exhibits important re-
turns to scale (large average costs and small marginal costs), …rms …nd it prof-
itable to deter copying: they set a price for their information product which is
low enough to make copying unpro…table for all users. For copying technologies
with lower returns to scale, the latter option is too costly and …rms prefer there-
fore to tolerate copying: they accommodate ‘®-reversing users’ (i.e., those users
who contemplate purchasing or copying all goods). Finally, if the marginal cost
of copying is low and close enough to the average cost, the copying technology
exhibits weak returns to scale and a symmetric equilibrium fails to exist. The
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reason for such inexistence is the following. When all other …rms choose to ac-
commodate ®-reversing users by setting a relatively high price, users consider
that originals have become so expensive that copying (using a rather cheap
technology) is preferable. As a result, any individual …rm has an incentive to
deviate by setting a lower price and accommodating instead the copying users.
Consider now bad copies. Although, other things being equal, copying is
less attractive than in the previous case, it turns out that there is no symmetric
equilibrium where …rms manage to deter copying. To understand this seemingly
paradoxical result, it must be recalled that with bad copies, each …rm must set
a high enough price to deter users from reversing their purchase decision. In
contrast with the case of high-quality copies, a …rm’s individual deterrence price
increases with the price set by the other producers. As a result, the section
of a …rm’s best-response function where deterrence is the optimal conduct is
upward-sloping (meaning that prices become strategic substitutes) and reaches
prices which are above the unconstrained monopoly price. Yet, the assumptions
of the present section prevent the monopoly price to be part of a symmetric
equilibrium and, by the same token, so do they for any higher price. This
explains why there is no symmetric deterrence equilibrium for bad copies. Two
possible attitudes remain. For a su¢ciently high average cost of copying, there is
a symmetric equilibrium where producers tolerate copying: they accommodate
reversing users for a su¢ciently low marginal cost of copying, or copying users
otherwise.
6.3 Comparison with the cartel case
In this paper we have shown that …rms’ equilibrium strategies signi…cantly dif-
fer under oligopolistic competition than under cartels setting a unique price.
Whereas the cartel can blockade piracy, deter copying users or accommodate
copying users, oligopolistic …rms may choose to blockade piracy, deter ®-reversing
users, accommodate ®-reversing users and blockade copying users. In the
oligopoly, individual …rms are able to free ride on each other by extracting some
additional copiers or buyers’ surplus which cannot be appropriated through the
single price of the cartel. This leads to several implications.
First, in contrast to cartels, there often exists no equilibrium with a symmet-
ric (single) price in oligopolies. Second, symmetric prices in oligopolies (if they
exist) can exceed the cartel’s price. For instance, when users have high valua-
tions for originals and copies, cartels choose to accommodate copying users and
oligopolies can yield symmetric equilibria with accommodation of ®-reversing
users (see Figure 4). The prices are given by pc¤ for the cartel (see Proposition
1) and by p®¤i (p) = p for the oligopoly. We readily get that
pc¤ = 1
2
£
(so ¡ sc) µ + AC (n)¤ < nn + 1 £(so ¡ sc) µ + AC (n)¤ = p
This result is true whether copies are good or bad.
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Third, oligopolies can yield symmetric equilibria with deterrence of ®-reversing
users whereas cartels may never choose to deter. For example, when users have
high valuations for originals and copies, cartels choose to accommodate copying
users although oligopolies may yield equilibria with deterrence of ®-reversing
users (see good copies in Figure 4). In oligopolies, the deterrence price can be
above or below the cartel price.
7 Conclusion
Information goods fall in the category of public goods with exclusion, that is,
“public goods the consumption of which by individuals can be controlled, mea-
sured and subjected to payment or other contractual limitation” (Drèze, 1980).
Exclusion can be achieved through legal authority and/or technical means.
However, simply specifying intellectual property laws does not ensure that they
will be enforced; similarly, technical protective measures are often imperfect
and can be “cracked”. As a result, illicit copying (or piracy) cannot be com-
pletely avoided. It is therefore extremely important to understand how copying
a¤ects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing behavior of
their producers. In particular, closer attention must be devoted to the strate-
gic interaction among producers, which results from increasing returns to scale
in the copying technology. The users’ decision to invest in such technology is
based, indeed, on a comparison between the cost of the copying equipment and
the prices of all the goods that can be copied. The demand for a particular
original is therefore indirectly a¤ected by the prices of other originals.
The present paper addresses this issue within a simple, uni…ed model of
competition between originals and copies. We use the vertical di¤erentiation
framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978): copies are seen as lower-
quality alternatives to originals. We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria
of the pricing game played by n oligopolists (each one controlling one good).
Using the terminology of Bain (1956), we show that under cartels, piracy will
be blockaded, deterred (through symmetric limit-pricing) or accommodated.
Under oligopolistic competition, …rms’ equilibrium strategies signi…cantly di¤er
than those under cartels. An oligopolistic …rm may indeed choose to blockade
piracy and blockade copying users as cartels but it can also choose to free ride
on other …rms by extracting some additional copiers or buyers’ surplus which
cannot be appropriated through the single price of the cartel. In these two last
strategies, the …rm sets its prices according to the valuations of users who are
enticed to reverse their copying decision because of the free riding …rm’s price.
By setting a price di¤erent from other …rms, a fre-riding …rm is able to increase
its pro…t either by increasing its price when competitors set a low price or by
reducing its price and increasing its own demand when competitors set high
prices. As a result, oligopolies may have no symmetric equilibria; when they
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do, they may end up with higher prices than in the cartel.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We must show that pg ¸ maxµ pEi (µ). Note …rst that AC(n¡1)=sc < µ is equiv-
alent to pci
¡
µ
¢
> p¯i
¡
µ
¢
and implies that pg = AC(n ¡ 1) + (so ¡ sc) µ < soµ.
Then, it can be observed that the function pEi (µ) reaches a local maximum
at pi = p`i (AC(n)=sc) and µ = AC(n)=sc and, that it reaches another local
maximum either at pi = pci
¡
µ
¢
and µ = µ or at pi = p
¯
i
¡
µ
¢
and µ = µ according
to whether pci
¡
µ
¢
> p¯i
¡
µ
¢
or not. We check two cases accordingly. On the one
hand, suppose that pci
¡
µ
¢
> p¯i
¡
µ
¢ () AC(n ¡ 1)=sc < µ. Then, we must
check that the conditions pg = AC(n¡1)+(so ¡ sc) µ > p`i (AC(n)=sc) and pg =
AC(n ¡ 1) + (so ¡ sc) µ > pci
¡
µ
¢
are satis…ed. The …rst condition is indeed sat-
is…ed because, by Assumption 2, we have that scµ > AC(n) () (so ¡ sc) µ >
AC(n)so=sc ¡ AC(n), which implies (so ¡ sc) µ > AC(n)so=sc ¡ AC(n ¡ 1)
() .AC(n¡1)+(so ¡ sc) µ > AC(n)so=sc = p`i (AC(n)=sc). The second condi-
tion is satis…ed because, by Assumption 1, we get that AC(n¡1) ¸ AC(n) ()
AC(n¡1) ¸ C 0(n) () AC(n¡1)+(so ¡ sc) µ ¸ C 0(n)+(so ¡ sc) µ = pci
¡
µ
¢
:
On the other hand, suppose that pci
¡
µ
¢
< p¯i
¡
µ
¢ () AC(n¡1)=sc > µ. Then
we must simply check that soµ > max
n
p`i (AC(n)=sc) ; p
¯
i
¡
µ
¢o
, which is always
true by Assumption 2.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 5
When the lowest envelop of the price function is equal to pEi (µ) ´ min
©
p`i (µ) ; p
c
i (µ)
ª
,
the price function itself writes as pi(µ) = min
©
p`i(µ); max [p
c
i (µ); p
®
i (µ; p)]
ª
. It
has only two possible concave kinks at µ®`(p) and µlc and possibly another
convex kink at µ®c(p). The graph of the demand function is the same as the
graph of the price function (after inversion of the horizontal axis). Given this
con…guration, it is easily seen that, as p increases, …rm i’s best response can
jump only once. Therefore, the interval [bp1; bp2] collapses to a single point, saybp.
The direction of the jump is given by the two following statements about
optimal price and pro…t under linear demand functions. Construct two linear
demand functions. First, if both demand functions yield the same optimal
unconstrained pro…t, the optimal price is higher under the steeper function.
This statement is no longer correct if the optimal pro…t is constrained. Second,
let us consider the locus of the optimal price and quantity for each demand
schedule when they are shifted in a parallel way. Then, the locus of optimal
prices and quantities goes through the origin, and the locus of the steeper
demand curve is also steeper.
Consider the possible price strategies under pEi (µ). First, if the optimal
strategy is pE¤i = p`¤, then the best response is p`¤ for all p and there is no
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deterrence or accommodation regime. We need only to consider pE¤i = pc¤ or
pC . Let us draw the price functions and the locus of reversing user accom-
modation for all possible p (i.e., ©(p; µ), the optimal price and quantity under
p®i (p; µ)). Let us also draw the iso-pro…t curve passing through either p
c¤ or pC .
In the case of bad copies, the locus of reversing user accommodation passes on
the right-hand side of the optimal prices and quantities related to p`¤i , pc¤ and
pC . It is easily shown that there exists a downward jump (see the top panels
in Figure 5). In the case of good copies, the locus of reversing user accommo-
dation passes on the left-hand side of the optimal price and quantity related
to p`¤i , and on the right hand side of the price and quantity related to pc¤. If
pE¤i = pc¤; then we have that pc¤ > pC and that the locus of reversing user
accommodation lies between the prices and quantities associated to p`¤i and
pc¤: Drawing the iso-pro…t curve associated to pc¤, it can readily been shown
that accommodation of reversing users always exists and that the best response
function has a downward jump from p®¤i (bp) to pc¤ (see the bottom-left panel in
Figure 5). Finally if pE¤i = pC ; then we have that pc¤ < pC . Two situations
occur. On the one hand, the locus of reversing user accommodation can be
located to the left-hand side of the price and quantity associated with pC , and
the best response function continuously decreases in the reversing user regime
down to pC . No jump occurs (see the bottom-right panel in Figure 5). The
condition for this situation is obviously that bp 2 [pf ; pd]. On the other hand,
the locus of reversing user accommodation can be located on the right-hand
side of the price and quantity associated with pC . As p increases, the best
response function must switch from the reversing user regime to the accommo-
dation regime before discontinuously moving downward from p®¤i (bp) to pc¤ (as
in the bottom-left panel in Figure 5).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) If the other …rms choose to accommodate ®-reversing users, then …rm i
makes a larger pro…t by accommodating copying users at price pE¤i than by
accommodating ®-reversing users. The …xed point under accommodation of
®-reversing users solves the equation p = p®¤(p) and yields the following price
and pro…t
pa¤ = n
n + 1
¡
AC (n) + (so ¡ sc) µ¢ and ¼a¤ = n ¡AC (n) + (so ¡ sc) µ¢2
(n + 1)2 (so ¡ sc) ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢
On the one hand, consider that pE¤i = pc¤ = 12
¡
AC (n) + (so ¡ sc) µ¢ > pC
which yields the following pro…t level:
¼c¤ =
¡
AC (n) + (so ¡ sc) µ¢2
4 (so ¡ sc) ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ :
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Figure 5: Jumps in optimal prices
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Some algebraic manipulations show that ¼c¤ > ¼a¤ and thus that accommo-
dating copying users is more pro…table. On the other hand, consider that
pE¤i = pC = (so=sc)AC (n) > pc¤ which implies that
¼C =
so
¡
µsc ¡ AC (n)¢AC (n)
s2c
¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ :
Using the fact that pC > pc¤ () µsc (so ¡ sc) < (2so ¡ sc)AC (n) ; we can
easily show that ¼c¤ > ¼a¤ and thus that accommodating copying users is more
pro…table.
(ii) If the other …rms choose to accommodate copying users at price p = pE¤i ,
then …rm i makes a larger pro…t by accommodating ®-reversing users at price
p®¤(pE¤i ) than by accommodating copying users at price p = pE¤i . On the one
hand, consider again that pE¤i = pc¤. At the price p = pc¤, …rm i’s optimal price
and pro…t under accommodation of ®-reversing users are
p®¤i (pc¤) =
1
4
(n + 1)
¡
AC (n) + (so ¡ sc) µ¢ ;
¼®¤ (pc¤) =
¡
(so ¡ sc) µ + AC (n)¢2 (n + 1)2
16 (so ¡ sc)n2 :
Some algebraic manipulations show that ¼®¤ (pc¤) > ¼c¤ and thus that accom-
modating ®-reversing users is more pro…table. On the other hand, consider
that pE¤i = pC . At the price p = pC , …rm i’s optimal price and pro…t under
accommodation of ®-reversing users are
p®¤i
¡
pC
¢
=
1
2
¡
µn (so ¡ sc) + C (n) ¡ (n ¡ 1) (so=sc)AC (n)¢ ;
¼®¤
¡
pC
¢
=
¡
nsc (so ¡ sc) µ ¡ AC (n) ((n ¡ 1) so ¡ nsc)¢2
4ns2c (so ¡ sc)
¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ ;
which can also been shown to be larger than ¼C .
8.4 The case with high valuation users
Best response function. There are two possible cases according to whetherbp is below or above pd. We note that ¼`¤i > ¼c¤i . Indeed, the optimal pro…t
collected under demand p`i (µ) can never be smaller than the one obtained under
demand pci (µ) since p
`
i (µ) > p
c
i (µ) 8µ 2 (µ; µ]. We now have to compare ¼c¤i
with the pro…ts under ®-reversing deterrence, ¼Di (p) and under ®-reversing
accommodation, ¼®¤i (p). One can compute:
¼c¤i =
¡
(so ¡ sc) µ + C 0 (n)¢2
4 (so ¡ sc) ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ ;
¼Di (p) =
1¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ (n ¡ 1) p ¡ C (n)(n ¡ 1) so ¡ nsc so
µ
¹µ ¡ (n ¡ 1) p ¡ C (n)
(n ¡ 1) so ¡ nsc
¶
;
¼®¤i (p) =
¡¹µn (so ¡ sc) + C (n) ¡ (n ¡ 1) p¢2
4n (so ¡ sc) ¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ :
31
Because a rise in p increases the constraint on demand for loyal users p`i ,
the pro…t ¼Di (p) must decrease in p. Also, since the demand of reversing users
gets smaller when p rises, the pro…t ¼®¤i (p) must decrease in p: Hence, in any
case, there exists a price bp above which the accommodation of copying users is
pro…table.
Let us derive the exact value of bp. There are two possible cases according
to whether ¼c¤i intersects ¼Di (p) or ¼®¤i (p). De…ne
¼di ´ ¼®¤i
³
pd
´
= ¼Di
³
pd
´
=
ns2o (so ¡ sc) ¹µ2¡¹µ ¡ µ¢ ((n + 1) so ¡ nsc)2 :
Now, compute the value of C0 (n) such that ¼c¤i = ¼di :
C0 (n) = C 00 ´ (nsc ¡ (n + 1 ¡ 2
p
n) so) (so ¡ sc)
(n + 1) so ¡ nsc µ:
In the …rst case, C0 (n) is lower than C 00, ¼c¤i is lower than ¼di and the price
jump takes place at bp0 such that ¼®¤i (bp0) = ¼c¤i :
bp0 = pd + pn
n ¡ 1
£
C 00 ¡ C0 (n)
¤
:
In the second case, C 0 (n) is larger than C 00, ¼c¤i is larger than ¼di and the price
jump takes place at bp00 such that ¼Di (bp00) = ¼c¤i :
bp00 = pd + 1
2 (n ¡ 1)
£
F
¡
C 0 (n)
¢ ¡ F ¡C 00¢¤ ;
where
F
¡
C 0 (n)
¢ ´ r³sc(so¡sc)¹µ2¡2C0(n)(so¡sc)¹µ¡C0(n)2´((n¡1)so¡nsc)2so(so¡sc) :
Note that ¼`¤i > ¼c¤i makes sure that F (¢) is a well-de…ned function of C0 (n).
Symmetric equilibria. (1) Blockading piracy cannot be a symmetric equi-
librium. From Proposition 2, blockading piracy is an equilibrium if and only if
AC (n) ¸ ¹µsc=2. But, according to Assumption 5 and 6, µsc ¸ AC(n ¡ 1) and
µ > 2µ + C 0(n)=(so ¡ sc). It is easily seen that the three inequalities cannot be
simultaneously satis…ed.
(2) Deterrence of ®-reversing users under good copies. We …rst show that
under good copies, Assumption 6 implies that C 0(n) < C 00, so that bp > pd.
Assumption 6 rewrites as C0 (n) <
¡
µ ¡ 2µ¢ (so ¡ sc) ´ C 01. Now, C01 < C00
() ((n + 1) so ¡ nsc) µ > ((n + 1 ¡ pn) so ¡ nsc) µ, which is always true if
copies are good (and n ¸ 4) as the right-hand side is negative.
The …rst condition for a symmetric equilibrium is:
pDi
³
pf
´
< pf () AC (n) < ¹µsc=2:
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The second condition is either pDi
¡
pd
¢ · pd () pd · AC (n) (so=sc) ()
1
2
¹µ
³
1 ¡ nsc¡(n¡1)so(n+1)so¡nsc
´
· AC (n) =sc. It is easily checked that the interval de…ned
by the two conditions is open.
(3) Accommodation of ®-reversing users. This strategy is feasible if and
only if C0 (n) < C 00, under which bp = bp0 < pd. In this case, there are two
conditions for a symmetric equilibrium. We …rst need that pd · pDi
¡
pd
¢
. That
is,
AC (n) · 1
2
¹µsc
µ
1 ¡ nsc ¡ (n ¡ 1) so
(n + 1) so ¡ nsc
¶
: (8)
Second, we need that bp0 ¸ p®¤i (bp0). To simplify computations, we prefer to use
the equivalent formulation: at p = p®¤i (p), we have that ¼®¤i (p) ¸ ¼c¤i . We
compute
p = p®¤i (p) () p =
¹µ (so ¡ sc) + C (n)
n + 1
;
¼®¤i (p) ¸ ¼c¤i () ¹µn (so ¡ sc) + C (n) ¡ (n ¡ 1) p ¸
p
n
¡
(so ¡ sc) µ + C0 (n)¢ ;
which gives
bp0 ¸ p®¤i (bp0) () AC (n) ¸ (n+1)pn¡2n2n ¹µ (so ¡ sc) + (n+1)pn2n C 0 (n) (9)
Let us check that the conditions (8) and (9) are compatible. They de…ne an
open interval if
C0 (n) < 2n(n+1)pn
µ
1
2
¹µsc
³
1 ¡ nsc¡(n¡1)so(n+1)so¡nsc
´
¡ (n+1)
p
n¡2n
2n
¹µ (so ¡ sc)
¶
:
where the right-hand side is just equal to C0o; as C0 (n) < C00 in the present
case, the interval is open.
(4) Accommodation of copying users. Accommodation of copying users oc-
curs if and only if pc¤i is larger than bp0 or bp00. Suppose …rst that C0 (n) < C 00.
We need pc¤i > bp0, which is equivalent to:
C 0 (n) > 2n
n ¡ 1 + 2pnAC (n) +
n ¡ 1 + 2pn
n + 1 ¡ 2pn¹µ (so ¡ sc) ;
which is clearly impossible because C 0 (n) < AC (n) by Assumption 1 and
2n= (n ¡ 1 + 2pn) > 1. Consider next the case where C0 (n) > C00. We need
pc¤i > bp00, which is equivalent to:
AC (n) <
1
2n
¹µsc +
n ¡ 1
2n
C 0 (n) ¡ F (C
0 (n))
2n
:
The latter inequality is compatible with C 0 (n) · AC (n) if and only if
(n + 1)C0 (n) + F
¡
C 0 (n)
¢
< ¹µsc;
which cannot be excluded by our assumptions.
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